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I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime delimitation issues are important in Africa because there is
invariably a causal link between maritime boundary disputes and potentially
valuable natural resources located in the disputed maritime area, which could
provide much needed sources of wealth to the disputing party that eventually
succeeds in establishing a legal claim to such territory.1  Further, if such disputes
are not settled by peaceful means they could escalate to serious conflicts between
the disputing parties that may lead to loss of lives. The recent judgement by the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) Special Chamber on the
Maritime Boundary delimitation between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire is another
example of peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and a contribution to the
international jurisprudence on maritime boundary delimitations emerging from
the African region.2 This decision is particularly significant for the following
reasons. First, it is the first maritime boundary delimitation case coming up before
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1. E.g., TIM DANIEL, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES VOL. V. 3429-3437, 3605-
3616 (David Colson & Robert Smith eds., 2005).
2. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the Atlantic
Ocean (Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_corr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8D4-N8YM] [hereinafter Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire]. Other decisions of international
courts on maritime boundary delimitation issues between African States include: Continental Shelf
(Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Case No. 63, Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18 (Feb. 24);
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 77 I.L.R 635 (1985);
Arbitration of the Maritime Boundary (Guinea-Bissau/Sen.), Arbitration, 83 I.L.R. 1, 35-39, ¶¶ 61-
68 (July 31, 1989) (the ICJ upheld the procedural validity of this award in Arbitral Award of 31
July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 53 (Nov. 12); The Land and
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea
intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303 (Oct. 10) and Maritime Delimitation in the Indian
Ocean, (Somalia v. Kenya), Application Instituting Proceedings, (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.icj-
cij.org/en/case/161[https://perma.cc/FAY9-CAAE] (filed on the 28 August 2014 and ongoing
before the ICJ).
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the ITLOS that involves two African States.3 Second, it is the second maritime
boundary delimitation case decided by the ITLOS since its establishment in
1996.4 Third, it is the second case to be decided by a Special Chamber established
by the ITLOS at the request of Parties and the first of such Special Chambers to
deal with maritime boundary delimitation.5 Fourth, it is the first maritime
delimitation case in international jurisprudence involving the delimitation of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles where one of the parties to the
dispute had completed the procedure before the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) and received the recommendations of the CLCS.6 
Further, it is the first delimitation case before the ITLOS that involves a
3. Of course the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Case No. 63,
Judgment, 1982 I.C.J Rep. 18 (Feb. 24)(instituted before the ICJ in 1978), Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 77 I.L.R 635 (1985) (brought before the
Arbitral Tribunal in 1983) and the The Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and
Nigeria, (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303 (Oct. 10)
(instituted in 1994) were instituted before the ICJ long before the ITLOS was established. 
4. The first case on maritime boundary delimitation was the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16,
Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, 2012 ITLOS Rep. 4, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/
cases/case_no_16/published/C16-J-14_mar_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6NR-QTYC] [hereinafter
Bangladesh v. Myanmar].
5. The first special Chambers established at the request of the Parties by ITLOS is the 
Conservation and Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean,
(Chile/European Community), Case No. 7, Order of Dec. 20, 2000, 2000 ITLOS Rep. 148
https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-7/ [https://perma.cc/V4QX-GKUF],The
representatives of the Republic of Ghana and the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in Hamburg on 3
December 2014 had concluded a Special Agreement to submit the dispute concerning the
delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Atlantic Ocean to a Special Chamber of the Tribunal
to be formed pursuant to article 15, paragraph 2, of the ITLOS Statute. Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case
No. 23, Special Agreement, Dec. 3, 2014 https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/
case_no.23_merits/X001_special_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XCK-SLD8].
6. Ghana has completed the CLCS procedure and the CLCS had on the 5 September 2014
made its recommendations on the Ghanaian continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. See
Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard
to the Submission made by Ghana on 28 April, 2009, United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
in Regard to the Submission Made by Ghana on 28 April 2009, (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gha26_09/2014_09_05_COM_sumRE
C_GHA.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD2N-NHNB]. Cote d’Ivoire, on the other hand, though it has made
its submissions on its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles has not yet completed the CLCS
procedure. U.N. Secretary-General, Receipt of the submission made by the Republic of Cote
d’Ivoire to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, CLCS.42.2009.LOS (May 13,
2009). http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_civ_42_2009.htm
[https://perma.cc/2WC7-5YS4].
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producing oil and gas field, the Tweneboa, Enyenra and Ntomme (TEN) fields.
This article critically engages with certain lessons as regard maritime
delimitation that may be discerned from the Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire dispute, the
decision of the ITLOS Special Chamber and the aftermath of this decision. This
is particularly important because there are potentially other maritime delimitation
disputes that could arise from the African region that could eventually result in
international litigation, including the Somalia/Kenya dispute currently before the
International Court of Justice.7A 2007 Declaration by the Conference of African
Ministers in Charge of Border Issues  states that African States should “take the
necessary steps to facilitate the process of delimitation and demarcation of
African borders, including maritime boundaries, where such an exercise has not
yet taken place.”8 This Declaration made pursuant to the Decision of the African
7. The Somalia/Kenya dispute is yet to be argued on the merits. The latest development in
this case is the order of the ICJ dated 2 February, 2018 which authorised the submission of a Reply
by Somalia by 18 June, 2018 and a Rejoinder by 18 December, 2018, https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/161/161-20180202-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. Other potential maritime dispute,
for instance, is that between Angola, on the one hand, and Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) and Gabon, on the other hand. See, e.g., U.N. Secretariat, Letter dated April 11, 2014 from
the U.N. Secretariat addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and
Francophonie of the Democratic Republic of Congo, No. 130/093/2014 (April 11, 2014) and
Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Letter dated Oct. 7, 2015 from the
Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of Congo addressed to the U.N. Secretariat,
No.132.61/RDCONU/A1/597/2015 (Oct. 7, 2015) by the DRC and Permanent Mission of the
Gabonese Republic, Letter dated May 30, 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Gabonese
Republic addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 00402/MRPG/NY-14 (May 30,
2014) by Gabon to the CLCS on the potential maritime delimitation disputes as regard the
submission of Angola to the CLCS, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_
files/submission_ago_69_2013.htm [https://perma.cc/3RFG-BHA8]. Also, the potential maritime
dispute between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, which is reported to have been referred to the ICJ,
but so far is yet to be officially included in the docket of the ICJ, See Mark Oloo, Top Court Set to
Arbitrate in Gabon, Equatorial Guinea Border Row, STANDARD DIGITAL (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001229384/top-court-set-to-arbitrate-in-gabon-
equatorial-guinea-border-row [https://perma.cc/3CLW-FEZE]. In addition, apart from that with
Cote d’Ivoire, we see Ghana identified in its CLCS submission potential maritime delimitation
issues between Ghana, on the one hand, and Benin, Togo and Nigeria, on the other hand. See
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 5, ¶ 7. On delimitation issues
between South Africa and Namibia, on the one hand, and South Africa and Mozambique, on the
other, see PATRICK H.H. VRANCKEN, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 195-204 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2011). 
8. Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its Implementation Modalities
as Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers In Charge of Border Issues Held in Addis
Ababa (Ethiopia) On 7 June 2007, African Union, ¶ 5(a)(i) June 7, 2007, http://www.peaceau.org/
uploads/border-issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GLJ-D56S]and Para.18 of the Decision on the
Activities of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the State of Peace and
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Union (AU) Assembly urged the AU Commission to pursue efforts at prevention
of conflicts, by promoting peaceful delimitation and demarcation of such borders,
including through the implementation of the AU Border Programme (AUBP),
which was established in 2007 as an outcome of the decision of the Assembly.9
The AUBP, which has been described as “an epoch-making development in
African international law and international relations” aims to finalise the
delimitation of both land and maritime boundaries, as well as the demarcation of
land boundaries,10 with a rather ambitious deadline to do so, initially set at 2012
then extended to 2017, but now further extended to 2022.11 It has had rather
limited success in settling maritime delimitation disputes amongst African
States,12 and appears to have been rather inconspicuous in its involvement in a
number of maritime boundary dispute settlement processes in Africa, including
that of Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire. 
In January 2014, a major maritime strategy adopted by the AU, the 2050
Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy, urged that the AU, through the
AUBP, should make an assertive call for the peaceful settlement of existing
maritime boundary issues.13 It however, failed to specifically deal with the critical
need for African States to engage with third party arbitral/judicial dispute
settlement as regards such maritime boundary issues if the efforts at negotiations
and settlement amongst these States, with or without the involvement of the
AUBP, fails.14 Subsequent to the 2014 Strategy, the AU in 2016 adopted a treaty,
the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa
(the Lomé Charter), yet to come into force, which requires States’ Parties shall
“endeavour to delimit [their] respective maritime boundaries in conformity with
provisions of relevant international instruments.”15 The treaty, again, does not
Security in Africa, Doc. Assembly/AU/3/(VIII), ¶ 18 (Jan. 29-30, 2007).
9. For more on the African Union Border Programme see GBENGA ODUNTAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN AFRICA 108-125 (2015).
10. Id. at 108
11. Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and Measures for its Consolidation,
African Union , ¶ 3, October 6, 2016. https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/10629/declaration-on-
the-african-union-border-programme-and-measures-for-its-consolidation-6-october-2016.pdf
[perma.cc/R6HV-DB5N].
12. For instance, the AUBP has received requests by Comoros and Madagascar for assistance
in the delimitation of their maritime borders. It has supported Benin and Togo in the delimitation
of their maritime boundary. It is also involved in the current process of the delimitation of Lake
Tanganyika amongst four Riparian States – Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Zambia and facilitated
the delimitation of Lake Malawi(Lake Nyasa) straddling between Malawi and Mozambique. See
African Union Comm. On the Implementation of the African Union Border Programme (AUPB),
Progress Report, ¶¶ 7, 8, 13, 17 (May 2018).
13. African Union, 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy), ¶ 58,
(Jan. 2014).
14. See Edwin Egede, Institutional Gaps in the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy,
1 JOURNAL OF OCEAN LAW & GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 10-15 (2016).
15. Art.13. The Lomé Charter requires that the treaty would come into force 30 days after
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provide much details on how the States’ Parties should go about this, neither does
it make specific reference to the AUBP. So far, amongst the majority of African
States, as we would see from the Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire situation, it would appear
that there is a preference by African States for bilateral negotiations amongst
themselves on maritime delimitation disputes, without involving the AUBP, and
when these negotiations fail these parties have had recourse to the third-party
dispute settlement mechanisms available under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 82.
This article would start with providing a background to the maritime
delimitation dispute between Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire to put the dispute and the
decision of the Chamber in perspective. It then progresses to analyse the decision
of the Chamber, focusing on the aspects of the decision on tacit agreement,
estoppel and delimitation methodology. Thereafter, it explores some key issues
arising in the aftermath of the decision and then concludes with some closing
remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are adjacent coastal States located in the West
African region along the Gulf of Guinea and bordering the Atlantic Ocean. The
maritime delimitation dispute between these two neighbouring States appears to
be accentuated by the large amount of hydrocarbons that had been discovered in
the relevant areas.16 In 2007 the Jubilee field was discovered by Ghana and
subsequently, in 2009, it discovered the TEN oil fields about 3 nautical miles east
of Jubilee oil field, both being developed on behalf of Ghana by Tullow Oil
Company and its joint venture partners.17 It is curious to note that both Parties in
the course of the extensive pre-litigation negotiations did not at any point make
representations to the AU nor involve the AUBP in the exchange and negotiation
process.18 This is interesting considering that both Parties were part of a 2009
Pan-African Conference organized by the AU on Maritime Boundaries and the
the 15th instrument of ratification (see Art.50(1)). As at 8 August 2018, though 35 States have
signed the treaty, only one State(Togo), has ratified it. African Charter on Maritime Security and
Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) art. 13, 50(1), Oct. 15, 2016, https://au.int/sites/
default/files/treaties/33128-sl-african_charter_on_marit ime_security_and_safety_
and_development_in_africa_lome_charter.pdf  [perma.cc/7JUF-D66T] [hereinafter Lomé Charter]. 
16. See MARK OSA IGIEHON, THE BAKASSI DISPUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: CONTINUING CHALLENGES 140-141 (Edwin E. Egede & Mark Osa Igiehon eds. 2017).
17. See West Africa, TULLOW OIL, https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/west-africa
[https://perma.cc/RGZ3-QZJM].
18. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, ¶¶ 164-192
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09
.2017_corr.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8D4-N8YM]. 
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Continental Shelf for the implementation of the AUBP which held in Ghana.19
The conclusions of this Conference, while acknowledging the significant progress
made by member States of the AU in the delimitation of their maritime
boundaries and also their efforts in determining the outer limits of their outer
continental shelves, urged those who had not done so to expedite the delimitation
of their maritime boundaries in order to meet the deadline set by the AU to do
so.20 The probable reason for the non-involvement of the AUBP could be because
of the application of the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity by the
African Union.21 For instance, one of the decisions of the Assembly of the AU
had stressed on the need to “ensure smooth division of labour on the basis of the
principles of subsidiarity and complementarity among all stakeholders.”22
Although, there is no clear definition of the principles of subsidiarity and
complementarity in the AU context, what is clear is that it depicts the notion that
issues should be dealt with at the national or Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) level and only escalated to the AU institutions if it is not feasible or
possible to deal with such at the national or RECs level.23 The Declaration on the
AUBP by the Ministers responsible for border issues acknowledged the
19. The Pan African Conference on Maritime Boundaries and the Continental Shelf for the
Implementation of the African Union Border Programme, Conclusions, ¶ 2, (Nov. 9-10, 2009). The
following AU member States attended: Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
SADR, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, the Gambia, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda. 
20. Id. ¶ 7.
21. It should be noted that the African Union Commission in its Strategic Plan 2014-2017
emphasises that it would be guided by, amongst other principles, the principle of subsidiarity and
complementarity with other Organs, Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
African Union Commission, Strategic Plan 2014-2017, ¶ 325, (June 2013), https://au.int/
sites/default/files/pages/32028-file-the_au_commission_strategic_plan_2014-2017.pdf
[perma.cc/TA5K-J6AX]. The Lomé Charter without defining complementarity, in a rather prolix
manner defines subsidiarity as ‘the principle that seeks to guarantee a degree of independence for
a lower authority in relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to central
government. It therefore involves the sharing of powers between several levels of authority.’ Lomé
Charter, supra note 15, at art. I.
22. Decision on the Report of the Commission on Development of the African Union Agenda
2063 and the Report of the Ministerial Follow-up Committee on the Bahr Dar Retreat, ¶ 14,
Assembly/AU/Dec.565 (XXIV), (January 30-31, 2015).
23. RECs include the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) in Western
Africa; the Arab Maghreb Union(AMU/UMA) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan
States(CENSAD) in Northern Africa; the East African Community(EAC) and the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development(IGAD) in Eastern Africa; the Southern African
Development Community(SADC) in Southern Africa; the Common Market for Easter and Southern
Africa(COMESA) in South eastern Africa and the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) in Central Africa OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON AFRICA, The Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) of the African Union, http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/recs.shtml
[http://perma.cc/K4JV-3VQ7].
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importance of respecting the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity and
encouraged this in the implementation of the AUBP to avoid duplication of
efforts.24 Clearly, the Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire were of the view that the whole
process of seeking to delimit their maritime boundaries could be dealt with at the
national level without the necessity of involving the AUBP. Perhaps the Parties
had hoped that a bilateral approach to negotiations would be swifter and less
complicated.
At a point when the Parties in the dispute under analysis could not agree on
the delimitation methodology of the disputed maritime areas they progressed to
adjudication. According to the President of Ghana, the resort to judicial
settlement had as its “primary objective and interest” the need to “secure legal
certainty” of the maritime boundaries, thereby, bringing “finality to a dispute with
a valued neighbour.”25 While, the pioneering Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) resolution on border disputes, including maritime boundary disputes,
indicated a preference for African States to settle such disputes by “peaceful
means and within a strictly African framework”26 and the 1974 Declaration of the
OAU on the Issues of the Law of the Sea evinced the need “to establish such
regional institutions as may be necessary and to settle disputes between [African
States] in accordance with regional arrangements,”27 it must be noted that up to
date no regional dispute settlement mechanism has been established in Africa that
has the remit to adjudicate on maritime boundary disputes amongst African
States.28 Even if such regional dispute mechanism is eventually established it
would merely be one of the options in the settlement of their maritime boundary
disputes available to African States Parties to UNCLOS 82 under Part XV.29
24. Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and Measures for its Consolidation,
African Union, ¶ 10, October 6, 2016.
25. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, President, Ghana, address at a ceremony in honour of
Ghana’s Maritime Boundary Dispute Legal Team (Oct. 20, 2017) (transcript available in the
Presidency Republic of Ghana Speeches), http://presidency.gov.gh/2018/index.php/briefing-
room/speeches/423-address-by-the-president-nana-addo-dankwa-akufo-addo-at-a-cermony-in-
honour-of-ghanas-maritime-boundary-dispute-legal-team [perma.cc/38UU-D3LG].
26. Preamble 5 of the OAU Resolution on Border disputes among African States,
AHG/Res.16(I), adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government held in Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964.
27. Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the issues of Law of the Sea, ¶ 11,
Doc. A/CONF.62/33 (1974).
28. One of the authors to this article, in line with wide range of choices available to States
Parties involved in maritime disputes, had argued for an African regional dispute settlement
mechanism (in form of a Chamber in the merged African Court of Justice and African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights being dedicated to dealing with Law of the Sea issues). See Egede,
supra note 14, at 10-15.
29. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 280, 282, Dec.10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397. Para. 7(iv) of the Conclusions of the 2009 Pan-African Conference on Maritime
Boundaries and the Continental Shelf for the Implementation of the African Union Border
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In the Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire situation, since both States were Parties to the
UNCLOS 82 and had both not filed declarations indicating choice of procedure
under Articles 287 and 298, Ghana initiated these proceedings against the
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire on 22 September 2014, under annex VII.30 This
recourse to arbitration under annex VII by Ghana was however superseded by a
resort to ITLOS after both Parties negotiated and cooperatively entered into a
Special Agreement and Notification dated 3 December 2014, with the Minutes
of the Consultation annexed to the Agreement.31 Under this Special Agreement
the entire dispute was transferred to a Special Chamber of the ITLOS established
in accordance with Article 15(2) of the Statute of the Tribunal, comprising of five
judges, three permanent ITLOS judges and two judges ad hoc appointed by each
of the Parties.32 Ghana requested the Special Chamber to delimit, in accordance
with the principles and rules set forth in United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS 82) and international law, the complete course of the single
maritime boundary dividing all the maritime areas appertaining to both Parties in
the Atlantic Ocean, including the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. It
further requested a determination of the precise geographical coordinates of this
single maritime boundary in the Atlantic Ocean.33 
Programme appeared to acknowledge this by stating that ‘in cases of border disputes, Member
States should explore all options as provided by UNCLOS, other organs of the UN, including
recourse to African legal processes and conflict resolution mechanisms.’ The Pan African
Conference on Maritime Boundaries and the Continental Shelf for the Implementation of the
African Union Border Programme, Conclusions, ¶ 7(iv), (Nov. 9-10, 2009).
30. Ghana previously had filed a declaration dated 15th December 2009 indicating that it did
not accept the procedures under Art.287 of the UNCLOS 82(i.e. ITLOS, ICJ, Arbitral Tribunal
under Annex VII and Special Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VIII) as regard disputes indicated in
Art.298(1), including maritime delimitation disputes. This declaration was withdrawn in September
2014. See UNITED NATIONS, Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, http://www.un.org/depts/
los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm [https://perma.cc/J2N7-NTEK].
31. Note that nothing in the Part XV dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS 82 prevents
disputing states parties from agreeing to submit to the ITLOS a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention otherwise excluded from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
by way of Art.297 or a Declaration filed. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
art. 299, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
32. Permanent Judges were Judge Boualem BOUGUETAIA, as President of the Special
Chamber; Judge Rudiger WOLFRUM, Judge Jin-Hyun PAIK, while the Judges ad hoc were Mr
Thomas MENSAH(Ghana), a former judge of ITLOS (1996-2005) and Judge Ronny ABRAHAM
(Cote d’Ivoire), a serving member of the International Court of Justice(ICJ)(2005 to date).
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Minutes of Consultations, Dec. 3, 2014 [https://perma.cc/
4AL4-2EQX] [hereinafter Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire Minutes].
33. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, ¶ 2, https://www.
itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_corr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8D4-N8YM].
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It is curious to note, though the ITLOS has established a standing Chamber
for Maritime Delimitation Disputes,34 the Parties chose to utilise the Special
Chamber provision, whereby an ad hoc Chamber is established at the request of
the Parties to deal with the particular dispute and composed of judges determined
by the Tribunal with the approval of the parties.35 It could be said that the
flexibility of the Special Chamber, which gives the Parties some control in the
setting up of the Chamber and the composition of the judges, would be preferred
by Parties that have an inclination towards a more arbitral, rather than a
permanent court, type approach to dispute settlement, but yet still enjoying some
of the advantages of the latter.36  As Judge Wolfrum points out:
[i]n the ad hoc chamber system [of the ITLOS], the parties can enjoy all
the benefits of ordinary arbitration, without having to bear the expenses
of the chamber. There is also the added advantage that a judgment given
by an ad hoc chamber, like the one given by any other special chamber,
is considered to have been rendered by the full Tribunal.37
Indeed, it would be fascinating to see if other African States having maritime
boundary delimitation disputes in future would display a preference for the use
of the ITLOS Special Chamber dispute settlement mechanism. Interestingly, only
a handful of African States that have filed choice of procedure declarations under
Article 287 of UNCLOS. Most of these States, namely Angola, Cape Verde,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Tunisia and Tanzania, have
indicated a preference for the ITLOS as their first choice.38 Some others like
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon specifically made no choice under article 287.
Algeria explicitly indicates that it does not consider itself bound by the provisions
of article 287, paragraph 1 (b), of the [said Convention] dealing with the
submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice and declared that, in
order for a dispute to be submitted to the International Court of Justice, prior
agreement between all the Parties concerned would be necessary in each case.
Guinea-Bissau rejected the ICJ jurisdiction for any type of disputes. Cape Verde,
34. Other such Chambers established by the ITLOS are Chamber of Summary Procedure, the
Chamber for Fisheries Disputes and the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes. See Chambers,
INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/chambers/
[https://perma.cc/H4WS-THNB].
35. Int’l Tribunal of Law of the Sea [ITLOS], Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, art. 15(2).
36. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of
Justice, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 831-54 (Oct. 1987).
37. GOVERNING OCEAN RESOURCES – NEW CHALLENGES AND EMERGING REGIMES: A
TRIBUTE TO JUDGE CHOON-HO PARK 283 (Jon M. Van Dyke, Sheery P. Broder, Seokwoo Lee and
Jin-Hyun Paik eds., 2013).
38. Twelve African States have made choice of procedure declarations as at 25 July 2018.
Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/depts/los/settlement_of_
disputes/choice_procedure.htm [https://perma.cc/J2N7-NTEK].
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on the other hand, chose the ICJ as its second choice. While Egypt chose the
arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII as its first choice and
Tunisia goes for this procedure as the second choice. For all other African States
that have not made formal declarations the Annex VII procedure, of course,
would be deemed to be applicable.39
It is interesting to note that the process in the Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire case from
the initiation of the case to the final decision at the Special Chamber was
relatively speedy as compared to similar cases before the full ICJ.40 It is important
to note that the ICJ also has provisions to establish ad hoc chambers and from
experience cases before such ad hoc chambers before the ICJ have also been
decided relatively quickly.41 Of course, the authors are not unaware that there are
other variables to be considered, such as the length of litigation in international
courts, the number of cases in the Courts’ docket (a busier court may take longer
to deliver decisions) and the number of contested interim issues raised in a case
(such as preliminary objections and request for provisional measures, etc) and the
length of time it would take the Parties to file their memorials, counter-
39. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 287(3), Dec.10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
40. In the Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire case the Special Chamber was established by ITLOS Order
of 12 January 2015 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in
the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order of Jan. 12, 2015, and incidental
proceedings began with a request for provisional measures by Cote d’Ivoire on 27 February, 2015,
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 2, Request for Provisional Measures of Feb. 27, 2015, and the
final judgement on the merits of the case was delivered on 23 September 2017, in less than 3 years
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017. The ICJ cases on the other hand
dragging for an average of 5-8 years [See for instance, Tunisia v. Libya (1978-1982) and Cameroon
v. Nigeria (1994-2002)]. The case between Somalia v. Kenya was instituted on the 28 August 2014
and there is still no indication on when the final judgement would be delivered. Maritime
Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Case No. 161, Application Instituting
Proceedings of August 28, 2014.
41. The first ad hoc chamber was formed in 1982 in the case concerning the Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), Order, 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Jan. 20),
between Canada and the United States, and the second in 1985 in the case concerning the Frontier
Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Order, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (April 3), between Burkina Faso and the
Republic of Mali. The third was set up in March 1987 in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v.
It.), Order, 1987 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Mar. 2) between the United States of America and Italy, and the
fourth was formed in May 1987 in the The Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El.
Sal./Hond.), Order, 1987 I.C.J. Rep. 10 (May 8), between El Salvador and Honduras. 2002 saw the
formation of the fifth, to deal with the Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) case, and the sixth, to hear
the Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) The
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El. Sal./Hond.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 392 
(Dec. 18).
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memorials, rejoinders, counter-rejoinders and other court documents.42 However,
it would appear that the utilisation of ad hoc chambers of either the ITLOS or ICJ
may be a quicker option to settlement of maritime delimitation disputes which
African States may seek to explore. On another note, what may be observed in the
litigation strategy of the Parties in the Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire case, which further
contributed to the relatively speedy determination of the case, was what appeared
to be a minimisation of the number of preliminary proceedings that would have
unnecessarily prolonged the case.43 The only preliminary proceeding in this case
was the request by Cote d’Ivoire to the Special Chamber to prescribe provisional
measures under Article 290 of UNCLOS 82 requiring Ghana to:
• take all steps to suspend all ongoing oil exploration and exploitation
operations in the disputed area;
• refrain from granting any new permit for oil exploration and
exploitation in the disputed area;
• take all steps necessary to prevent information resulting from past,
ongoing or future exploration activities conducted by Ghana, or with
its authorization, in the disputed area from being used in any way
whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire; 
• generally, to take all necessary steps to preserve the continental
shelf, its superjacent waters and its subsoil; and
• desist and refrain from any unilateral action entailing a risk of
prejudice to the rights of Côte d’Ivoire and any unilateral action that
might lead to aggravating the dispute.
Provisional measures, which are binding orders for which non-compliance can
lead to state responsibility, may be prescribed under UNCLOS 82 either to
preserve the rights of the parties or to prevent serious harm to the marine
environment pending the final decision of the dispute.44 Over the years
international jurisprudence, has identified that provisional measures would be
prescribed when the Court or Tribunal is satisfied by a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction  over the matter; that the rights of the party seeking the measures,
without of course going into the merits on the arguments of both sides, are
plausible (the so-called plausibility test) and that there is an urgency to grant the
measures because of the real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice could
be caused to the rights in dispute before the final decision.45 Furthermore, the
42. See generally OSA IGIEHON, supra note 16, at 4-24.
43. See Minutes Annexed to the Special Agreement Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23,
Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_
merits/X001_1_Ghana-Cote_d_Ivoire_PV_consultations_E_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5KF-
ZQ23] where the Parties agreed that if any objection was raised on the jurisdiction of the Chamber
or the issue of admissibility would be dealt with, not separately, but together with the merits. 
44. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 290(1), Dec.10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
45. La Grande (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgement, 2001, I C.J. Rep. 466 (June 27).
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Court or Tribunal is expected to weigh and balance the respective rights of the
parties based on their arguments.46 In the current case under analysis although the
Chamber, based on the agreement of both parties, was satisfied that it had prima
facie jurisdiction and the rights which Cote d’Ivoire claimed were plausible,47 it
was not prepared to grant the latter State all the provisional measures it had
requested. First, the Chamber was not convinced, based on the evidence, that an
order stopping ongoing drilling activities would actually protect the marine
environment, but rather it felt that granting such order could actually cause harm
to the marine environment.48 Further, it was of the view that prescribing a
provisional order that includes the suspension of ongoing exploration or
exploitation activities would have resulted in huge financial loss for Ghana,
which on the balance would cause prejudice to its rights and impose an undue
burden on it.49 Eventually, the Chamber, acting under the ITLOS Rules,
unanimously prescribed certain provisional measures, some of which were at
variance with what was actually requested by Cote d’Ivoire, directing Ghana to
take the following necessary steps:
• to ensure that no new drilling either by it or entities under its control
took place in the disputed area;
• to prevent information from past, ongoing or future exploration
activities conducted by it or under its authorisation as regard the
disputed area (not already in the public domain) from being used in
any way to the detriment of Cote d’Ivoire;50
• to carry out strict and continuous monitoring of all activities by it or
under its authorisation in the disputed area to ensure the prevention
of serious harm to the marine environment. 
Furthermore, the provisional measures prescribed by the Chamber required both
parties to take all necessary steps to prevent serious harm to the marine
46. For an excellent analysis of the Chamber’s Order of 25 April 2015 and international
jurisprudence on provisional measures see Yoshifumi Tanaka, Unilateral Exploration and
Exploitation of Natural Resources in Disputed Areas: A Note on the Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire Order
of 25 April 2015 before the Special Chamber of ITLOS, 46 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT &
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015).
47. Id. ¶¶ 34-38, 58.
48. Id. ¶¶ 99, 101. See id. ¶ 67. Further, the Court held that Cote d’Ivoire had not adduced
sufficient evidence in support of its allegations that the ongoing activities of Ghana in the disputed
area was such as to create an imminent risk of serious harm to the marine environment. See id. ¶
67.
49. Id. ¶¶ 99, 100.
50. See id. ¶ 95. Ghana had given an undertaking that it was in a position to give Cote
d’Ivoire exclusive access to confidential information about the natural resources in the disputed
Continental Shelf if ordered to do so at the conclusion of the Case which was placed on record by
the Chamber because it was of the view that the acquisition and use of information about the
resources of the disputed area would create a risk of irreversible prejudice to the rights of Cote
d’Ivoire if the Chambers in its decision on the merits eventually found that the latter State had
rights to all or any part of the disputed area. 
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environment, including the continental shelf and the superjacent waters in the
disputed area, and to cooperate in order to achieve this. In addition, it prescribed
an omnibus order requiring the parties to pursue cooperation and to refrain from
any unilateral action that would aggravate the dispute. Also, it decided that both
parties should submit an initial report of compliance with the implementation of
the provisional measures not later than a specified date and submit further reports
subsequently at such date that the President of the Chamber may request such
information.51
An interesting point from the Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire case is what appeared
to be a cooperative approach adopted by the parties in their litigation strategy, as
reflected in the successful negotiation of a Special Agreement amongst
themselves, which led to the transferring of the case from the annex VII
arbitration proceeding to the ITLOS Special Chamber. It must be noted that the
ability of the parties in this case to transfer from annex VII arbitration to the
ITLOS Special Chamber is an affirmation of the core essence of the dispute
settlement provisions of UNCLOS 82, in that it provides a multiplicity of dispute
settlement mechanisms, thus giving parties to disputes arising under the
Convention flexibility and a wide-range of choices.52 Although, some concerns
have been expressed by well-meaning international lawyers that such
proliferation of international courts and tribunals could lead to the fragmentation
of international law of the sea, there is no concrete empirical evidence in support
of this.53 According to Charney: 
[w]e should celebrate the increased number of forums for third-party
settlement found in the Convention and other international agreements
because it means that international third-party settlement procedures,
especially adjudication and arbitration, are becoming more acceptable.
This development will promote the evolution of public international law
and its broader acceptance by the public as a true system of law.54
51. Id. ¶ 108.
52. One of the authors to this article, in line with wide range of choices available to States
Parties involved in maritime disputes, had argued for an African regional dispute settlement
mechanism (in form of a Chamber in the merged African Court of Justice and African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights being dedicated to dealing with Law of the Sea issues). Egede, supra
note 14, at 10-15.  
53. See Alan Boyle, Dispute settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 37-54
(1997); THOMAS A MENSAH, THE ROLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN CONTEMPORARY OCEAN
POLICY AND LAW IN ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 92 (Davor Vidas &
Willy Ostreng eds.,1999) and Thomas A Mensah, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED
NATIONS LAW 323 (1998).
54. Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement
Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. 90 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
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The actual panacea to any concern of fragmentation of international law is
certainly not to artificially limit the range of choices available to States, but rather
to take concrete steps to ensure that judges appointed to the various international
courts or tribunals or arbitral bodies are persons socialised to the specific areas
of international law that such court, tribunal or arbitral body has jurisdiction
over.55 In view of the rather technical and specialised nature of the law of the sea,
such judges should not just be generalist in international law, but should be
acknowledged law of the sea experts. This could be seen in the range of judges
appointed for the Special Chamber, including the judges ad hoc, who are
acknowledged experts on the law of the sea.56 Although, technically the common
law doctrine of judicial precedent is not meant to apply in international courts and
tribunals,57 we see, for instance in the Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire Case, that these
socialised judges are actually guided by relevant decisions of other international
courts, tribunals and arbitral bodies, and in appropriate cases distinguish why they
would not be guided by such previous decisions.58 According to Judge Treves, in
his declaration in Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary
between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v.
Myanmar):
The framers of the Convention [UNCLOS 82] would seem not to have
been concerned about the danger of fragmentation that decisions on the
same body of law by different courts and tribunals might entail, a danger
that some, but certainly not all, scholars and practitioners consider grave.
In order to avert such danger and to prove that the possibility of decisions
by different courts and tribunals on the same law may be a source of
richness and not of contradiction, all courts and tribunals called to decide
on the interpretation and application of the Convention, including its
provisions on delimitation, should, in my view, consider themselves as
parts of a collective interpretative endeavour, in which, while keeping in
mind the need to ensure consistency and coherence, each contributes its
grain of wisdom and its particular outlook. The coexistence of a
LAW 73-74 (1996).
55. See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, THE PROFESSIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A PROFESSION 33-36 (Jean D’Aspremont, Tarcision Gazzini, Andre
Nollkaemper and Wouter Werner eds., 2017).
56. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire Minutes, supra note 32 (includes composition of the Chamber). See
also Arts. 2(1) and 15(1) of the Statute of the ITLOS.
57. See for instance Art. 33(2) of the Statute of the ITLOS. 
58. Also, we see other International Courts and Tribunals referring to the decisions of the
ITLOS. For instance, in the recent decision of the ICJ on provisional measures in the Application
of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), Order, 2017 I.C.J. Rep. 152 ¶ 6 (April 19) (separate opinion by Tomka, J.) we
see Judge Tomka in his separate declaration relying on the ITLOS Special Chamber decision in the
Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire case on provisional measures. 
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jurisprudence on delimitation of the International Court of Justice with
awards of arbitration tribunals augurs well.59
Another key point that would be considered here is the issue of the critical date
in the dispute under analysis. Despite the evident role played by the discovery in
the disputed areas of huge reserves of hydrocarbons, the exact critical date when
the maritime delimitation dispute arose between these two States is unclear.
While Ghana identified February 2009 as the critical date, Cote d’Ivoire
disagreed and pointed out that the date chosen by Ghana was a date the Ghanaian
government considered favourable to it and the critical date should either be 1988
(which it suggested as the critical date in its rejoinder) or any other dates such as
1992, 2011 or even 2014 (when the case was submitted by Ghana to
arbitration).60 This issue was not given much attention by the Special Chamber.
Without referring to any previous international jurisprudence the Chamber
determined that the notion of the critical date in the case was irrelevant since the
activities of both parties in the disputed maritime area had not changed over the
years.61 The Chamber took the position that it could determine the case without
having to make an emphatic decision on the critical date.62 This is interesting as
the issue of the critical date is meant to have the huge evidentiary value of
assisting an International Court or Tribunal in determining what activities of the
parties may no longer affect the disputed territorial issue at stake and thus should
not be relied upon.63 According to the ICJ in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
Case the critical date is important for the following reasons:
In the context of a maritime delimitation dispute or of a dispute related
to sovereignty over land, the significance of a critical date lies in
distinguishing between those acts performed à titre de souverain which
are in principle relevant for the purpose of assessing and validating
effectivités and those acts occurring after such critical date, which are in
general meaningless for that purpose, having been carried out by a State
which, already having claims to assert in a legal dispute, could have
taken those actions strictly with the aim of buttressing those claims. Thus
a critical date will be the dividing line after which the Parties’ acts
become irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the value of effectivités.64
Furthermore, in this ICJ decision, the Court cited its earlier decision in Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Case, which pointed out that activities after the
59. Bangl./Myan, supra note 4, ¶ 2.
60. Id. ¶¶ 203, 208.
61. Id. ¶ 210.
62. Id.¶ 208. 
63. See generally, L.F.E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW QUARTERLY, 1251-84 (1968). 
64. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 659, ¶117 (Oct. 8) [hereinafter Nicar. v. Hond.].
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critical date would have evidentiary value if ‘such acts are a normal continuation
of prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose of improving the legal
position of the Party which relies on them.’65 Although, the Chamber in the
Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire Case was not inclined to specifically identify a critical
date for the purposes of the dispute, as pointed out earlier, because it was of the
view that subsequent activities of the parties were a continuation of the previous
ones,  Ghana had raised concerns as regard the 2016 chart prepared by Cote
d’Ivoire. It, in essence, challenged the evidentiary value of such chart because it
was “developed subsequent to the commencement of, and entirely for the
purposes of’ the case.”66 Cote d’Ivoire, on the other hand, denied this and alleged
that “the process of producing” the 2016 chart had actually begun in March
2014.67 Whilst the Chamber acknowledged that the 2016 chart was of recent
origin, and took the view that the chart was prepared “on the basis of
topographical surveys of the entire Côte d’Ivoire coast at the end of 2014,” thus
containing more recent data, it declined to utilise the chart solely on the technical
ground that a similar topographical survey was not carried out on the Ghanaian
side.68 It is argued that the Chamber could have made a determination on the
critical date with a view to determining whether the 2016 chart should be
excluded on this basis, rather than on this technical point. Arguably this chart
could not be said to be a continuation of previous ones and was undertaken for
the purpose of improving the legal position of one of the parties. However, the
Chamber relying on the technical point mentioned earlier declined to rely on the
2016 chart, but rather utilised two older charts, BA1383 and SHOM 7786.69 This
approach of the Chamber was criticised by Oude Elferink, who points out that the
“Chamber does not state any authority for its approach to the use of the charts.”70
It would appear that this faulty technical approach of the Chamber to the 2016
chart enabled it to side-step making a definitive finding on the arguments raised
by Ghana on the critical date.71 It could be argued that though the Chamber
declined to make a finding on the critical date, its extensive consideration of the
evidence of the parties of activities prior to the initial submission of the dispute
for Annex VII arbitration by Ghana would appear to suggest by implication that
it regarded the date of the initial submission of the dispute as the relevant critical
date when the dispute between the parties had undoubtedly crystallized.72 If this
65. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J.
Rep. 682, ¶ 135 (Dec. 17) [hereinafter Indon./Malay.].
66. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 332, 338.
67. Id. ¶¶ 338, 341.
68. Id. ¶¶ 339, 341-43.
69. Id. ¶ 341.
70. Alex Oude Elferink, Maritime Delimitation in Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire: Predictability . . .
with an Occasional Glitch, THE JCLOS BLOG (Feb. 6, 2018), http://site.uit.no/jclos/2018/02/06/
maritime-delimitation-in-ghana-cote-divoire-predictability-with-an-occasional-glitch/
[https://perma.cc/66NV-TSLE].
71. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶ 341.
72. The initial date of submission of the dispute for the Annex VII Arbitration was 22
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is accepted as the critical date, it could be argued that the 2016 chart, which it
acknowledged was prepared at the end of 2014, could have been excluded on the
ground that it was prepared after the critical date.
III. DECISION OF ITLOS SPECIAL CHAMBER
After taking arguments from both parties, the Chamber delivered its decision
on the merits on the 23rd of September 2017. This decision covered a number of
significant matters, however, this section would be limited to exploring the issues
of tacit agreement, estoppel and the method of delimitation of the maritime
boundary between the parties.73
A. Tacit Agreement
In the absence of an explicit formal delimitation agreement between the
parties, Ghana argued that there was a tacit agreement between the parties arising
over five decades (from 1957 to 2009) that recognised and respected a maritime
boundary following an equidistance line, which it constantly referred to in the
cause of its arguments as a “customary equidistance boundary.”74 As far as it was
concerned the case before the Chamber was primarily to affirm the customary
equidistance boundary between the parties,  established by extensive evidence
over the years in form of concession agreements and other oil practices,
presidential decrees, legislation, correspondence, maps, public statements,
representations to international organisations and oil companies. It also requested
in the alternative for the Chamber to proceed to the delimitation of the maritime
boundary between the parties if it found that there was no tacit agreement. Cote
d’Ivoire, on the other hand, of course vehemently disagreed that the case before
the Chamber was to affirm a customary equidistance boundary and that there was
any tacit agreement between the parties on the maritime boundary.75 The
Chamber found, in the light of the constituting Special Agreement concluded by
the parties, the dispute was actually concerning the delimitation of the maritime
boundary between the parties, with regard to the territorial sea, exclusive
September 2014.
73. This article would not engage with the issue of international responsibility of Ghana. See
Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 541-659, where the Chamber found that none of the
activities of Ghana engages its international responsibility.
74. Id. ¶ 102. See Article 15 and Common Articles 74(1) & (2) and 83(1) & (2) of UNCLOS
82. According to Judge Torres Bernárdez in his dissenting opinion in Nicar. v. Hond., supra note
64, at 799, ¶ 60: ‘Agreements are in fact the method most favoured by the Convention for
delimiting the maritime areas recognized in international law and, consequently, for a delimitation
of the three areas (territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf) by means of a
single line, as was requested of the Court by the Parties. The other rule-making parts of the relevant
articles of the Convention on the Law of the Sea are only intended to be applied in the event of a
lack of agreement between the States concerned.’
75. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 68-71, 100-06.
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economic zone and the continental shelf and was not to affirm the customary
equidistance boundary, as argued by Ghana.76  
On the issue of the tacit agreement, the Chamber explored the evidence and
arguments of the parties, as well as international jurisprudence on tacit
agreement.77 Relying on certain ICJ judgments relevant to tacit agreements in
maritime delimitation cases,78 the Chamber found that the evidence adduced by
Ghana was not compelling enough to establish such tacit agreement. It is curious
to note that the Chamber did not refer, on this issue, to the first delimitation case
before the ITLOS, Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal
(Bangladesh v. Myanmar), where the Tribunal had also decided relying on the
ICJ Nicaragua v. Honduras decision that the evidence presented by Bangladesh
fell short of “proving the existence of a tacit or de facto boundary agreement
concerning the territorial sea”79 It is not clear if this was deliberate or merely an
oversight. In the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case, Judge Lucky, in his dissenting
opinion, applying the same rigorous burden of proof, as enunciated by the
Nicaragua v. Honduras Case, arrived at a different decision from the majority.
As far as he was concerned Bangladesh had satisfied the burden of proof.80 He
appears to have based his decision on three key grounds. First, because the
affidavit evidence adduced by Bangladesh in support of its arguments, as the
party with the burden to prove such agreement, was not contradicted by
Myanmar.81 Second, that in determining whether the rigorous standard of proof
had been met to establish tacit agreement, such determination should be based on
evidence adduced, which should be considered conjunctively and not be based
merely on the submission of counsel not grounded on adduced evidence, no
matter how brilliant such submission is.82 This point is not convincing as the
majority decision actually considered the evidence adduced by Bangladesh, as the
State making the assertion. It would appear that the actual variance between the
majority decision and Judge Lucky was mainly based on the weight they gave to
the evidence adduced. While Judge Lucky was of the view that the evidence
provided by Bangladesh sufficed to establish a tacit agreement, the majority after
evaluating the affidavit evidences provided by Bangladesh was simply not
76. Id. ¶ 74.
77. Id. ¶¶ 107-228.
78. Such as Nicar. v. Hond., supra note 64, at 659, ¶ 253; Indon./Malay., supra note 65, at
625, ¶ 79 and Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 111 (Jan. 27)
[hereinafter Peru v. Chile].
79. Bangl./Myan., supra note 4, ¶¶ 117, 118. Interestingly, as we would see subsequently in
this article it referred to the first delimitation case in engaging with the other important issue of
estoppel.
80. See id. at 235-92, especially 235 (dissenting opinion by Lucky, J.).
81. Id. at 242. Also, Judge ad hoc Bernárdez, in his dissenting opinion, in Nicaragua v
Honduras, supra note 64, at 800-801, ¶ 65 appeared to accentuate his concern that the majority
judgement did not give appropriate legal effect to the fact that, in its reply, Nicaragua did not
contest nor qualify Honduras’s assertion.
82. Bangl./Myan., supra note 4, at 262, 265.
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convinced the evidence was cogent and compelling enough to establish such tacit
agreement.83 Third, Judge Lucky took the view that there was a variance in the
approaches of common law and civil law systems in engaging with the burden of
proof, which he appeared to suggest influenced individual judges’ determination
on whether or not there was a tacit Agreement. He pointed out that in common
law systems the standard of proof in civil cases is based on ‘preponderance of
evidence’ or ‘the balance of probabilities.’ On the other hand, he pointed out that
the burden of proof of civil law is more subjective and is “a matter for personal
appreciation of the judge, or ‘l’intime conviction du juge’ . . . if the judge
considers himself to be persuaded by the evidence and submissions based on the
evidence, then the standard of proof has been met.”84 He went on to suggest,
without really providing any concrete evidence in support, that the ICJ
jurisprudence adopts a civil law approach that appears to have influenced its
decision in most cases where it considered that inadequate evidence had been
adduced to support the existence of a tacit Agreement.85 Although, he did not
explicitly say so, he appeared to imply that the majority in the Bangladesh v.
Myanmar case adopted the civil law approach in evaluating the evidence and
arriving at its conclusion that Bangladesh had not established that there was a
tacit delimitation agreement in this particular case. The so-called common
law/civil law distinction as regard considering the evidence is not convincing
because a number of the international jurisprudence dealing with tacit agreements
have had judges from both the common law and civil law systems arriving at the
same outcome after evaluating the evidence on whether or not there was a tacit
agreement. For instance, in the Nicaragua v Honduras, the majority decision,
consisting of judges from both common and civil law jurisdictions held, after
evaluating the evidence, that Honduras had not provided compelling evidence to
establish a tacit delimitation agreement between it and Nicaragua.86 However,
83. Id. ¶¶ 112-18 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 242.
85. Id. It is important to note that Article 9 of the Statute of the ICJ requires that electors
should ensure that those elected as judges not only possess the required qualifications, but also to
ensure that the Court ‘as a whole . . . [represents] the main forms of civilization and of the principal
legal systems of the world’, including the common law and civil law legal systems. See also similar
provision in Article 2(2) of the Statute of the ITLOS which states: ‘[i]n the Tribunal as a whole the
representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution
shall be assured.’  
86. Nicar. v. Hond., supra note 64, at 735, 737, ¶¶ 253, 258. For instances, Judges Higgins
(UK), Koroma (Sierra Leone), Buergenthal (USA) and Keith (New Zealand), who were part of the
majority decision were from common law jurisdictions.  While Judge ad hoc Bernárdez (Spain)
who dissented is from a civil law jurisdiction. Also, the same applies in Peru v. Chile, supra note
78, at 38-39, ¶ 91, where the majority held that the Chile had established a tacit agreement with
Peru. Again, the same applies in Bangl./Myan., supra note 4, at 41, ¶ 118 before the ITLOS
Tribunal, the majority holding that Bangladesh had failed to establish such tacit agreement had a
mix of judges from both common and civil law systems. 
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what cannot be disputed from surveying some of the International jurisprudence
is that while the judges agree in principle that a stringent standard of proof is
required to establish a tacit delimitation agreement, there is sometimes a variance
in the outcomes by different judges evaluating the same set of evidence presented
before the International Court/Tribunal or Arbitral body. For instance, Judge ad
hoc Bernárdez in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua v Honduras,
disagreeing with the conclusion of the majority decision rejecting the existence
of a tacit agreement, stated as follows: 
In any event, as far as I am concerned, I believe that the evidence
submitted by Honduras, notably that concerning the oil and gas
concessions and fisheries regulation and related activities, argues
decisively in favour of the idea of the existence of a tacit agreement
between the Parties on the “traditional” maritime boundary. The majority
of the Court holds a different opinion, which I respect although I do not
subscribe to it. It is a judge’s prerogative to weigh and take a position on
the evidence presented by the Parties.87
In Peru v. Chile the situation was even more complicated. Here the majority
decision after evaluating the evidence concluded that there was a tacit agreement
between the parties to the case, which from the evidence “starts at the intersection
of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No.1 with the low-
water line, and continues for 80 nautical miles along that parallel . . .”88 As far as
the majority decision was concerned its task based on the tacit agreement was to
delimit using the usual delimitation methodology from the endpoint of the agreed
maritime boundary.89 On the other hand, in a joint dissenting opinion, some of the
judges, while generally agreeing with the majority, after evaluating the evidence
concluded that such tacit agreement ‘clearly indicates that the seaward end of the
boundary extends to 200 nautical miles’ and not 80 nautical miles, as indicated
by the majority decision.90 While Judge Sebutinde, in her separate dissenting
opinion, concluded that no agreement, tacit or otherwise, could be inferred from
the evidence submitted to the Court.91 As far as she was concerned, the evidence
adduced before Court was not compelling enough to meet the high standard of
proof required to establish such tacit agreement.92 In a criticism of the majority
decision, Judge Sebutinde stated as follows:
I also find highly problematic the basis upon which the Court has arrived
at its conclusion that the “agreed maritime boundary running along the
parallel of latitude” extends up to a distance of 80 nautical miles out to
87. Nicar. v. Hond., supra note 64, ¶ 65.
88. Peru v. Chile, supra note 78, at 65, ¶ 177. 
89. Id. ¶ 183.
90. Id. at 125. See Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Xue, Gaja, Bhandari and Judge ad hoc
Orrego Vicuna, ¶¶ 2, 35.
91. Id. ¶ 2.
92. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 15.
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sea. By the Court’s own admission, all the practice involving accidents
between the two Parties, including enforcement activities, was within
about 60 nautical miles of their coasts and usually much closer. It was
only starting in 1996 that arrests frequently occurred beyond 60 nautical
miles. . . It is unclear to me how the Court’s conclusion that the Parties
could not be said to have tacitly agreed on a maritime boundary beyond
80 nautical miles can simply be turned into a legal finding that they have
agreed on a boundary up to 80 nautical miles . . . In my view, this finding
of the Court rests on dangerously weak and speculative grounds.93
There is thus room to argue that the actual judicial application of the standard of
proof for tacit delimitation agreements lacks coherence, could sometimes be
subjective and rather problematic, especially in what may be considered as rather
ambiguous tacit agreement cases, where the evidence could technically be
interpreted for or against the finding on such agreement.  This, however, was not
a problem in the Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire case where the Judges, including Judge
ad hoc Mensah who was appointed by Ghana, were unanimous that the high
threshold of proof of a tacit delimitation agreement had not been met.94 Judge
Mensah pointed out as follows:
While the facts and arguments adduced by Ghana, provide a plausible
reason for Ghana to believe that the “customary equidistance” line has
been accepted by Cote d’Ivoire as the boundary between the two States,
Ghana has clearly not been able to prove that an agreement on this line
exists between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. International Jurisprudence has
constantly maintained that the threshold for the proof of an agreement on
a maritime boundary is very high . . . 95
It can only be presumed that this particular case is one of the few in international
jurisprudence where the evidence was unequivocal, and thus the judges were
unanimous in their view that the high burden of proof to establish the existence
of a tacit delimitation agreement had not been discharged. A key concern
expressed by the Chamber, which appeared to have had a significant impact on
the decision as regard this issue, was that evidence presented by Ghana was
spatially limited as it related solely to the specific purpose of oil activities in the
93. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
94. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶ 228.
95. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire
in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_J230917_SOMe
nsah_orig.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RKX-GPL8] (separate opinion by Mensah, J.); See also
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, ¶ 13, https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_SepOp_Paik_o
rig.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X9D-PE9Z] (separate opinion by Paik, J.).
76 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:55
seabed and subsoil, and was inadequate to prove the existence of an all- purpose
maritime boundary that should necessarily include superjacent water columns as
well. The Chamber also indicated that the Parties had not been able to provide
clear answers in response to its question on fisheries and other maritime activities,
which in itself weakened the arguments that there was a tacit agreement and
merely confirmed “‘the uncertainty as to the maritime boundary:” of the Parties.96
From a review of the cases it would appear that the arguments on the existence
of a tacit agreement is more likely to succeed if there is strong evidence,
preferably some evidence in writing, notably in form of some sort of Agreement
(falling short of a treaty as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 1969) endorsed by both parties,  which is accompanied by subsequent
practice of the parties that demonstrates the existence of an all-purpose boundary
evincing maritime activities not only in the seabed and subsoil, but also in the
superjacent waters as well.  On the other hand, on a more pragmatic note, it could
be contended that arriving at a unanimous outcome on the evidence adduced to
establish a tacit agreement is perhaps more probable in an International dispute
settlement body with a small number of judges.97
B. Estoppel
The Chamber also considered Ghana’s arguments that Cote d’Ivoire was
estopped by its acts from objecting to a maritime boundary based on the
customary equidistance line that it sought to establish by alleging a tacit
agreement between the Parties. Ghana had argued that there was clear, sustained
and consistent conduct of Cote d’Ivoire recognising the customary equidistance
line as the maritime boundary between the two Parties. Also, that Ghana had in
good faith relied on such conduct to its detriment.98 This was refuted by Cote
d’Ivoire, which argued, first, that estoppel is a contested notion that is rarely
applied in public international law; second, that international law does not include
the concept of delimitation by estoppel; and third, that Ghana’s argument on
estoppel was intended to be as a substitute for that which it raised on tacit
agreement, the existence of which it was unable to establish.99 In the alternative,
it argued that, even if estoppel is accepted in international law and could be
invoked in this particular case, Ghana had failed to establish the cumulative
conditions required for estoppel to apply.100 From international jurisprudence it
can be seen that the principle of estoppel has been raised by Parties from time to
time. For instance, in the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), the
issue of its application, along with the related doctrines of acquiescence and
96. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 226-28. 
97. For the other cases evaluated above, where there were marginal dissenting opinions the
judicial panel ranged from 15 to 22 judges. Bangladesh v. Myanmar had 22 judges on the Panel.
While of course in Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire Minutes, supra note 32, there were only 5 judges.
98. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 230-34.
99. Id. ¶ 235.
100. Id. ¶¶ 236-40.
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estoppel engaged the attention of some of the Judges of the ICJ.101 For instance,
Judge Alfaro, in his separate opinion, reviewing a number of cases of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and Arbitral bodies, as well as scholarly
contributions, though rather wary of adopting the designation ‘estoppel’, was
clear that this principle, which was similar though not exactly the same as the
‘anglo-american’ concept of estoppel, applied in the international setting.102 He
stated as follows:
[W]hen compared with definitions and comments contained in Anglo-
American legal texts we cannot fail to recognize that while the principle
. . . underlies the Anglo- Saxon doctrine of estoppel, there is a very
substantial difference between the simple and clear-cut rule adopted and
applied in the international field and the complicated classification;
modalities, species, sub-species and procedural features of the municipal
system. It thus results that in some international cases the decision may
have nothing in common with the Anglo-saxon estoppel, while at the
same time notions may be found in the latter that are manifestly
extraneous to international practice and jurisprudence.103
Judge Alfaro was of the opinion that the principle of ‘estoppel’ in the
international sphere was not merely procedural, but rather of a substantive and
fundamental character that it could on its own decide a matter in dispute. He also
pointed out that the primary foundation of this principle is based on good faith
prevailing in international relations “inasmuch as inconsistency of conduct or
opinion on the part of a State to the prejudice of another is incompatible with
good faith.”104 Also, Judge Fitzmaurice, preferring to designate estoppel as
‘preclusion’ and seeking to make a distinction  between this principle and the
similar principle of acquiescence, stated as follows:
The principle of preclusion is the nearest equivalent in the field of
international law to the common-law rule of estoppel, though perhaps not
applied under such strict limiting conditions (and it is certainly applied
as a rule of substance and not merely as one of evidence or procedure).
It is quite distinct theoretically from the notion of acquiescence. But
101. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J.
12 (June 15) [hereinafter Cambodia v. Thai.].
102. Id. at 39. He appeared to regard estoppel, preclusion, foreclusion and acquiescence as
synonymous terms or designations. See also THOMAS COTTER, EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES OF
MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION: THE QUEST FOR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 489 (2015), who distinguishing between estoppel and acquiescence points out that
‘[a]cquiescence . . . stands for the proposition of binding effects caused by passiveness and inaction
with respect to claims by another subject of international law, which usually calls for protest in
order to assert, preserve or safeguard rights and claims . . .’
103. Cambodia v. Thai., supra note 99, at 39-40. 
104. Id. at 42.
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acquiescence can operate as a preclusion or estoppel in certain cases, for
instance where silence, on an occasion where there was a duty or need to
speak or act, implies agreement, or a waiver of rights, and can be
regarded as a representation to that effect . . . 105
He pointed out that the essential condition for using the principle of estoppel or
preclusion is “that the party invoking the rule must have ‘relied upon’ the
statements or conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the
other’s advantage.”106 As regards maritime delimitation cases, we see that the
Court indicated in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that estoppel could be
applied in such cases in the international sphere. Here the Court pointed out that
a non-party State to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf would
be precluded from denying the applicability of the Continental Shelf regime
under the Convention if by reason of its past conduct, declarations etc. it had
“clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that régime” and if such conduct,
declarations etc. had caused another State to “detrimentally to change position or
suffer some prejudice.”107 However, the principle of estoppel was not applicable
in this particular case because no evidence was adduced in support of this. In
another delimitation case, the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf
of Maine Area, (Canada v. United States of America),a case heavily relied upon
by Ghana in putting forward its arguments on estoppel, the Chamber of the ICJ,
in its response to Canada’s reliance on estoppel and acquiescence against the
United States of America, pointed out the interesting similarity and difference
between the two principles as follows:
[T]he concepts of acquiescence and estoppel, irrespective of the status
accorded to them by international law, both follow from the fundamental
principles of good faith and equity. They are, however, based on different
legal reasoning, since acquiescence is equivalent to tacit recognition
manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as
consent, while estoppel is linked to the idea of preclusion. According to
one view, preclusion is in fact the procedural aspect and estoppel the
105. Id. at 62. 
106. Id. at 63. See dissenting Judgement of Wellington Koo, using the term ‘preclusion, ‘
while not averse to applying the principle in the international sphere, based on the evidence
disagreed with Judge Fitzmaurice that it applied in this particular case. Id. at 97, ¶ 47 (dissenting
opinion by Wellington Koo). See also id. at 130-31 (dissenting opinion by Sir Percy Spender). 
107. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark/Federal
Republic of Germany v. Norway), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 26, ¶ 30 (Feb. 20). See separate
opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo, who pointed out that estoppel did not apply in this present case
because there was no proof that Denmark and Norway changed their position for the worse by
relying on the acts of Germany. Id. at 96. Also Judge Ammoun was of the view that estoppel was
one of the general principles of law accepted as part of international law and the conduct and
intention of the party against whom it is relied on must be ‘ascertained by the manifestation of a
definite expression of will, free of ambiguity.’ Id. at 120-121, ¶ 22.
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substantive aspect of the same principle.108
Relying on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Chamber of the ICJ in the
Gulf of Maine Case held that since the evidence adduced by Canada on the
conduct of the United States of America was not clear and consistent, an essential
condition for establishing estoppel and acquiescence had not been satisfied.109
The ITLOS in its first delimitation case, Bangladesh v. Myanmar, which was
closely relied upon by the Chamber in the Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire case, referring
to the ICJ decisions in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and the Gulf of
Maine Case, pointed out as follows:
[I]n international law, a situation of estoppel exists when a State, by its
conduct, has created the appearance of a particular situation and another
State, relying on such conduct in good faith, has acted or abstained from
an action to its detriment. The effect of the notion of estoppel is that a
State is precluded, by its conduct, from asserting that it did not agree to,
or recognize, a certain situation.110
As far as the ITLOS was concerned in this case Bangladesh had not produced
sufficient evidence to discharge the burden of proof. Neither was the Tribunal
convinced by the evidence that Myanmar’s conduct had caused Bangladesh to
change its position to its detriment or that it suffered some prejudice in reliance
on such conduct.111 Again, Judge Lucky, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with
the conclusion of the majority decision on the issue of estoppel, and took the
view, that Bangladesh could rely successfully not only on the doctrine of estoppel
but also acquiescence against Myanmar. As far as he was concerned, for
acquiescence to apply a Party must overtly claim the relevant area as its own
against all other parties who had failed to object.112 He held that Bangladesh by
its evidence had convinced him that it overtly claimed the relevant area for 34
years, yet Myanmar did not object.113 He further held, as pointed above, that
Bangladesh had established through evidence the existence of a tacit agreement
and that Myanmar had waived its right to deny the evidence which the former
State had acted upon and relied on for 34 years, and was thus estopped from
changing its position. He was of the firm view that such change of position would
108. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 305, ¶ 130 (Jan. 20). Since the same facts in this case were relevant to the
two principles it chose to consider the two ‘as different aspects of one and the same institution.’ It
however pointed out somewhere else that ‘the element of detriment or prejudice caused by a State’s
change of attitude,’ is what distinguishes estoppel in the strict sense from acquiescence. See id. at
309, ¶ 145.
109. Id. ¶¶ 145, 148.
110. Bangl./Myan., supra note 4, ¶ 124.
111. Id. ¶ 125.
112. Id. at 267.
113. Id. 
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be detrimental to Bangladesh.114 What appears to come forth from the decision
of the ITLOS here is that whenever a Party relies on the same evidence to
establish both tacit agreement and estoppel its arguments on the latter would
stand or fall depending on whether the Court or Tribunal is convinced that the
evidence has established the former. Even, if a Party relies on completely
different evidence the threshold of the burden of proof of estoppel, like that for
establishing a tacit agreement, is quite high. It has been contended that the fact
that, so far, none of the maritime delimitation judgements (at least not the
majority decisions) has found the evidence adduced sufficient to ‘dispose of
delimitation and therefore [the] establishment of the boundary line’ by estoppel
or acquiescence provides evidence that such doctrines are applied stringently.115
Not surprisingly, the Chamber in Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire, relying on the
previous ITLOS decision in Bangladesh v. Myanmar, made short shrift of
Ghana’s arguments on estoppel since the facts and evidence it relied upon in
support were basically the same as that hinged on for its contentions that there
was a tacit delimitation agreement between the parties (which the Chamber had
previously rejected). The Chamber stated in its judgement that “Cote d’Ivoire
[had] not demonstrated, by its words, conduct or silence, that it agreed to the
maritime boundary based on equidistance,” appearing to suggest that the burden
of proof lies with Cote d’ Ivoire, whilst such burden of proof in actuality lay with
Ghana.116 Presumably, this was a slip as the international jurisprudence on
estoppel indicate clearly that the burden rests with the party asserting, in this case
Ghana. As Ghana had, in the view of the Chamber, based on the evidence
adduced, failed to establish that Cote d’Ivoire had made ‘clear, sustained and
consistent’ representation, a crucial requirement for establishing estoppel, it did
not feel the necessity, unlike the first ITLOS delimitation case, to make a
determination on whether Ghana acted in good faith on such representation.
Neither did it consider whether Ghana suffered any prejudice from such change
of conduct.117
C. Delimitation Methodology: Predictability or Flexibility?
The Chamber, dealing with the request by both Parties to draw a single
maritime boundary delimiting their territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and
continental shelves within and beyond 200 nautical miles, rejected the argument
of Cote d’Ivoire that the angle bisector methodology was applicable.118 As far as
it was concerned, based on international jurisprudence, the equidistance/relevant
circumstances methodology was the appropriate one,  in this particular case, for
114. Id. at 267, 268.
115. See COTTER, supra note 102, at 490.
116. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶ 224.
117. Id. at 75, ¶ 245. Contrast this with Bangl./Myan., supra note 4, at 42, ¶ 125.
118. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶ 254. Cote d’Ivoire had previously proposed that the
maritime boundaries be delimited by using a so-called geographical meridian method, which it
appeared to have abandoned in favour of the bisector approach.
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the delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf (both inner and outer).119 The Chamber pointed out that alternative
methodologies, such as the bisector methodology, would only apply as an
exception in narrow and peculiar situation (not applicable in the current case)
where it is impossible or inappropriate to draw a provisional equidistance line.120
Applying the three stage approach, the Chamber, after determining the
provisional equidistance line and considering arguments of the Parties on some
probable relevant circumstances, came to the conclusion that there were no
relevant circumstances that would justify the adjustment of the provisional line,
in this case.121 Furthermore, it found that the ratio of the length of the coastlines
of each Party did not lead to any significant disproportion in the allocation of
maritime areas to the Parties vis-à-vis the respective lengths of their relevant
coasts.122
The Chamber, in its unanimous decision, was clear that the law of maritime
delimitation should possess a degree of predictability.123 It stressed, relying on the
first ITLOS delimitation case, Bangladesh v. Myanmar, and the decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal in The Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration
(Bangladesh v. India),124 that while the paramount consideration guiding a Court
or Tribunal in a maritime delimitation case should be the goal of achieving an
equitable result, additionally “transparency and predictability of the delimitation
process as a whole” should be objectives to be taken into account.125 This is in
line with recent trends in international jurisprudence. It is interesting to explore
the various previous decisions of the ITLOS judges in Bangladesh v. Myanmar
on predictability versus flexibility in the application of the delimitation
methodology, where most of the judges in the full ITLOS learned in favour of
predictability in maritime delimitation methodology. The majority decision in this
case pointed out that, “[a] method of delimitation suitable for general use would
need to combine its constraints on subjectivity with the flexibility necessary to
accommodate circumstances in a particular case that are relevant to maritime
119. Id. ¶¶ 323-24.
120. Id. ¶ 289.
121. Id. ¶ 480.
122. Id. ¶¶ 535-37.
123. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, at para. 281. See, e.g., MALCOLM EVANS, THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 256-259 (Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elferink,
Karen Scott & Tim Stephens eds., 2015) (discussing the equidistance or equitable principles
debate). See also YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 196-209(2d ed.,
2015); see generally YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, PREDICTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE LAW OF
MARITIME DELIMITATION (2006)
124. In the Matter of the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl. v. India),
Award, 2014 Perm. Ct. Arb. 98, ¶ 339 (July 7), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/383
[https://perma.cc/XWX5-AS63].
125. Id.
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delimitation.”126 Also, Judges ad hoc Mensah and Oxman in their joint opinion
this case accentuated that “the equidistance/relevant circumstances method of
delimitation seeks to balance the need for objectivity and predictability with the
need for sufficient flexibility to respond to circumstances relevant to a particular
delimitation,” pointing out that maintaining such balance “requires that
equidistance be qualified by relevant circumstances and that the scope of relevant
circumstances be circumscribed.”127 Furthermore, Judges Nelson, Chandrasekhara
Rao and Cot in their joint declaration, pointing out the imprecision of the
provisions of the UNCLOS on the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental
shelf, acknowledged the efforts made by the international courts and tribunals
over the years to seek to achieve predictability in the method of delimitation and
stressed that the ITLOS “should welcome these developments and squarely
embrace the methodology of maritime delimitation as it stands today, thus adding
its contribution to the consolidation of the case law in this field”, as well as
“firmly uphold the three step approach as it has been formulated over the
years.”128 Judge Ndiaye, in his separate opinion in this case, underscored that
while the ultimate goal of the delimitation process was to achieve an equitable
result there had to be some predictability and consistency in the delimitation
methodology, because “the justice of which equity is an emanation is not abstract
justice but justice according to the rule of law.”129 Even though virtually all the
judges in Bangladesh v. Myanmar were emphatic on the importance of
predictability in the methodology of maritime delimitation in international
cases,130 it is interesting to note that Judge Lucky in his dissenting opinion
appeared to take the view that under the relevant provisions of articles 74 and 83
of UNCLOS flexibility trumps predictability in maritime delimitation
methodology. Disagreeing with the view of the majority on the applicability of
the equidistance/relevant circumstances and agreeing with Bangladesh that the
angle bisector approach was appropriate in this case, he pointed out as regards
choice of delimitation methodology that “flexibility and discretion are left to the
judges in the respective courts and tribunals.”131 He disagreed with the Counsel
for Myanmar that equidistance/relevant circumstances method was a part of
customary international law as reflected in the various decisions of the ICJ and
arbitral tribunals, but rather insisted that such decisions were “on a case-by-case
basis, [w]hile [the equidistance/relevant circumstance] may have been the most
suitable method in some cases, it was not in others.”132 From a review of the
judgements of the various judges in Bangladesh v. Myanmar and international
jurisprudence the real essence of the debate on predictability versus flexibility in
126. Bangl./Myan., supra note 4, at 65, ¶ 228.
127. Id. at 148, ¶ 4. 
128. Id. at 134.
129. Id. at 174, ¶ 84.
130. See also id. at 136-40 (Declaration of Judge Wolfrum), 184-96 (Separate opinion of
Judge Cot), 197-220 (Separate opinion of Judge Gao).
131. Bangl./Myan., supra note 4, at 279-80.
132. Id. at 280.
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delimitation methodology is as follows. Predictability, with room for flexibility
in exceptional and justifiable situations (i.e. when the equidistance/relevant
circumstances methodology would not achieve an equitable solution), on the one
hand, and complete flexibility repudiating predictability, on the other hand. 
There is no indication in the African States practice that there is a uniformly
adopted methodology on the delimitation in the absence of Agreement. During
the UNCLOS III there were certain African States that leaned towards
predictability by favouring the equidistance/relevant circumstances methodology
for EEZ and CS, while others favoured a more flexible approach as regard the
delimitation methodology.133 For instance, Kenya and Tunisia had proposed
during the UNCLOS III a draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf
or the exclusive economic zone stating as follows: “[t]he delimitation of the
continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone between adjacent and/or
opposite States must be done by agreement between them, in accordance with an
equitable dividing line, the median or equidistance line not being necessarily the
only method of delimitation.”134 While others, such as Gambia and Guinea Bissau
preferred that delimitation should be effected by utilizing “as a general principle,
the median or equidistance line, taking into account any special circumstances
when this is justified.”135 Not surprisingly, the 1974 Organisation of African
Unity Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, adopted at the onset of the
UNCLOS III, while touching on the exclusive economic zone, did not engage
with the issue of delimitation methodology.136 More recent African instruments
related to the African Seas, such as the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM)
Strategy 137 and the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and
Development in Africa (the Lomé Charter),138 while acknowledging the vital need
133. Gerard Tanja, The Contribution of West African States to the Legal Development of
Maritime Delimitation Law, 4 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 25-31 (1991).
134. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Kenya and Tunisia: draft article
on the delimitation of the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A
/CONF.62 /C.2 /L.28 (July 30, 1974). See also Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar,
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, United Republic of Cameroon,
United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire: draft articles on the exclusive economic zone, art. 8, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82 (Aug. 26, 1974) (which also insists on flexibility in terms of
methodology).
135. See UN. Doc. NG7/2 (April 28, 1978) (cited in Tanja, supra note 133, at 28-29).
136. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Declaration of the Organization
of African Unity on the issues of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/33 (July 19, 1974).
137. 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy [AIM] (XII(j)), ¶ 59, at 22 (Jan. 27, 2014)
(“Member States shall be encouraged to claim their respective maritime limits, including their
extended continental shelf where applicable. Member States are further urged to accept and fulfill
all those responsibilities that emanate from the establishment of maritime zones as foreseen by
UNCLOS and the IMO SOLAS Convention.”). 
138. African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa [Lomé
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for African States to delimit their maritime boundaries, in accordance with
International Law, they also do not explicitly engage with the issue of
delimitation methodology.   
Although, the decision of the Chamber in Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire leaned in
favour of the need for predictability in the delimitation methodology,139 there are
some concerns about some aspects of its application of the delimitation process,
notably its application of equidistance/relevant circumstances methodology to the
territorial sea and its rather feeble justification for doing so.140 While the Chamber
acknowledged that different rules apply to the delimitation of the territorial sea,
as distinct from that of the EEZ and CS, as well as the different nature of these
spatial areas (the territorial sea entailing sovereignty while the other zones are
merely functional),141 it went on to apply the delimitation methodology for the
EEZ and CS to the territorial sea because it interpreted the submissions of both
parties as permitting it to do so. It is not clear on what basis the Chamber arrived
at this understanding, except that it merely noted that the Parties did not put
forward comprehensive arguments concerning the delimitation of the territorial
sea. The Chamber failed to provide any convincing legal authority to justify the
deviation from the position of earlier jurisprudence, which indicate that the
International Court or Tribunal should first address the delimitation of the
territorial sea before progressing to delimit that of the EEZ and CS.142 
Charter] art. 13 (Oct. 15, 2016) (“Each State shall endeavour to delimit its respective maritime
boundaries in conformity with provisions of relevant international instruments.”).
139. Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 289, 323-24.
140. Id. at 257-63.
141. Id. ¶¶ 260, 262. 
142. See Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 2001, 40, 93, ¶ 174 (Mar. 16) (“Delimitation
of territorial seas does not present comparable problems, since the rights of the coastal State in the
area concerned are not functional but territorial, and entail sovereignty over the sea-bed and the
superjacent waters and air column. Therefore, when carrying out that part of its task, the Court has
to apply first and foremost the principles and rules of international customary law which refer to
the delimitation of the territorial sea, while taking into account that its ultimate task is to draw a
single maritime boundary [for the EEZ and CS] that serves other purposes as well.”); Bangl./Myan.,
supra note 4, ¶¶ 153-77; Oude Elferink, supra note 70 (who pointed out some concerns with the
Chamber using the same delimitation methodology for the territorial sea and the maritime zones
beyond; the Chamber’s preference to utilise two older charts rather than a more recent one, which
appeared to be out of sync with the decision in Guyana v. Suriname (although it is important to note
here that the Chamber did indicate it was declining to use the recent chart for the technical reason
that it was based on topographical surveys of only the Cote d’Ivoire Coasts only. See ¶ 341 of the
Judgement); its reasoning on the relevant coasts and relevant area and its approach to the handling
of arguments concerning coastal concavity and convexity.). See also Massimo Lando, Judicial
Uncertainties Concerning Territorial Sea Delimitation Under Article 15 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 66 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 589-
623 (2017) (analysis of judicial uncertainties as regarding Art. 15 UNCLOS delimitation);
Fakoyemi Olorundami, Objectivity versus Subjectivity in the Context of the ICJ’s Three-stage
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Another interesting issue concerning delimitation in Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire,
which involved two parties that had made submissions to the CLCS, with one of
the Parties, Ghana, having completed the submission procedure,143 is how the
Chamber treated the request of the Parties for delimiting the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles. The Chamber, in line with some recent international
jurisprudence, after stressing that in law there is only one single continental shelf,
rather than a distinction between inner and outer continental shelf,144 held that it
had the powers to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
However, it pointed out that it would exercise such powers to delimit “only if
such a continental shelf exists,”145 and in this particular case, as far as the
Chamber was concerned, “there is no doubt that a continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles exists in respect of the two Parties.”146 The Chamber did not
explicitly engage with the issue of how to determine certainty as regarding the
evidence of entitlement to an outer continental shelf. It has been bemoaned that
the Chamber failed to seize the opportunity to offer new insights and thereby
provide some clarity on the question of evidence of entitlement to the outer
continental shelf.147 However, from its decision the Chamber appeared to have
been influenced in arriving at the conclusion of certainty of entitlement by both
Parties based on the following grounds: First, the fact that Ghana had received its
recommendation from the CLCS. Second, that Cote d’Ivoire had made a full
submission to the CLCS, even though it was yet to receive the CLCS’
recommendations. Third, that neither of the Parties had contested the entitlement
of the other Party to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.148 Nonetheless,
this in itself does not provide any real clarity as to the admissibility of such outer
delimitation claims before international tribunals in the absence of a
recommendation by the CLCS.149 It is, however, interesting to note that the ICJ
Methodology of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 32 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE
AND COASTAL LAW 36-53 (2017) (for some subjectivity concerns in the application of the
application of the equidistance/relevant circumstances methodology in delimitation of the EEZ and
CS).
143. See Regarding Ghana Submission, supra note 6.
144. See Arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago, relating to the Delimitation
of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf Between Them, Hague Arb. Trib.
U.N.R.I.A.A. Vol. XXVII, at 147-251 (Apr. 11, 2006); Bangl./Myan., supra note 4; In the Matter
of the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl. v. India), Award, 2014 Perm. Ct. Arb.
(July 7). 
145. Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶ 491.
146. Id. ¶ 496.
147. See Lan Nooc Nguyen, UNCLOS Tribunals and the Development of the Outer
Continental Shelf Regime, 67 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 425-54 (2018).
148. See Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 494, 499-507.
149. See generally Giovanny Vega-Barbosa, The Admissibility of Outer Continental Shelf
Delimitation Claims Before the ICJ Absent a Recommendation by the CLCS, 49 OCEAN
DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-17 (2018) (interesting analysis of this issue); Nguyen,
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in its decision on the preliminary objection of the respondent in the Maritime
Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), another case from the
African region, said as follows:
A lack of certainty regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf, and
thus the precise location of the endpoint of a given boundary in the area
beyond 200 nautical miles, does not, however, necessarily prevent either
the States concerned or the Court from undertaking the delimitation of
the boundary in appropriate circumstances before the CLCS has made its
recommendations.150
Whilst, the ICJ indicates here that international courts or tribunals may delimit
outer continental shelf even before the CLCS has made recommendations to one
of the Parties, there again is no real clarity as to when exactly would be
‘appropriate circumstances’? Vega-Barbosa, whilst acknowledging, after an
analysis of various international cases concluded there was no definite answer to
this question. He however, proposes that the ‘appropriate circumstances,’ which
would cause the ICJ or an international Tribunal to hear an outer continental shelf
delimitation claim in the absence of a CLCS recommendation is where there is
the ‘absence of scientific uncertainty’ or where there is an agreement of the
Parties on the entitlement to outer continental shelf and the existence of
overlapping entitlements.151 Unfortunately, the Chamber in the Ghana/Cote
d’Ivoire case was not prepared to engage in a detailed analysis of this issue. 
IV. AFTERMATH OF DECISION ON MERITS—A JOINT
COMMISSION TO IMPLEMENT?
The decision of the Chamber, which basically had the effect of ensuring that
Ghana kept all its current oil and gas fields, was received with huge relief by
Ghana, and Tullow has since resumed drilling of the wells on its behalf. It is
projected that there would be full field development of around 24 wells in the
Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN) offshore fields consisting of 11 wells already
drilled before the ITLOS provisional measures order, and an additional 13 more
fields that would be developed after the decision on the merits. Furthermore,
Tullow anticipates that the 2018 production from the Jubilee field would average
75,800 barrels of oil per day.152 A notable point is that immediately after the
decision on the merits both Parties in a cooperative manner issued a joint
statement accepting the decision. The joint statement stated: “Cote d’Ivoire and
supra note 144. 
150. Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya), Judgment, 2017 I.C.J. Rep.
2017, ¶ 94 (Feb. 2), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/161-20170202-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RB6F-CKRG].
151. Vega-Barbosa, supra note 141, at 112.
152. Tullow’s new rig heads to TEN fields to commence drilling of wells, GHANAWEB (Feb.
22, 2018), https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Tullow-s-new-rig-heads-to-
TEN-fields-to-commence-drilling-of-wells-628356 [https://perma.cc/ZZ8T-LVEF].
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Ghana seize the opportunity to reiterate the mutual commitment of the two
countries to abide by the terms of this decision from the Special Chamber, and to
fully collaborate for its implementation. Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana accept the
decision, in accordance with the Statute of ITLOS.” 153 The statement also
stressed their “strong will to work together to strengthen and intensify their
brotherly relationships of cooperation and good neighbourliness.”154 
It should be noted that since the Chamber identified a starting point and base
points for the provisional equidistance line which differed from those advanced
by both Parties,155 the final boundary line, as decided, is not fully consistent with
that put forward by Ghana. Consequently, the final maritime boundary as
determined by the Chamber’s judgment would require careful implementation
that could involve some adjustments of existing blocks for mineral resource
activities as licenced by the Parties.156 The two States have since entered into a
Strategic Partnership Agreement covering a wide range of areas, including
maritime cooperation, incorporating the implementation of the decision of the
ITLOS Special Chamber; developing practical arrangements for the joint
exploitation and management of transboundary oil and gas and other resources,
as well as cooperation in development of their fishery resources and combating
illegal fishing.157 Based on this Strategic Partnership Agreement both States have
set up a Joint Committee to fully implement the decision of the ITLOS Special
Chamber.158 According to the President of Ghana, the Joint Committee is “to
153. Ghana: Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire ‘accept’ judgement of UN Tribunal on maritime dispute,
PANAPRESS (Sept. 23, 2017, 4:52:30 PM), http://www.panapress.com/Ghana--Ghana,-Cote-d-
ivoire--accept--judgement-of-UN-Tribunal-on-maritime-dispute--12-630525593-33-lang2-
index.html [https://perma.cc/Q2QD-AZ2H].
154. Id.
155. Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 355-56, 398-401.
156. See Pieter Bekker & Robert Van de Poll, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire receive a Strict-
Equidistance Boundary, 21 ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/21/issue/11/ghana-and-cote-divoire-receive-str ict-equ idistance-boundary
[https://perma.cc/8R6C-ZUXF].
157. See Article I(3) of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of Ghana and the Government of the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire (adopted 17 October
2017, entered into force on the same day). Article VI of the Agreement states that it shall become
effective upon execution. Other areas of Cooperation covered by the Agreement are defence and
security (this appears to be broad enough to cover both maritime, including piracy and illicit
bunkering, and terrestrial security issues)[Article I(1)]; Cocoa and Cashew Economy and other
strategic crops [Article I(2)]; Mining, Energy and Environment[Article I(4)]; Transport[Article I(5)]
and Economic Policies[Article I(6)]. 
158. The Joint Implementation Committee of the ITLOS Special Chamber judgment had its
maiden meeting in Abidjan in May 2018. The Joint Committee which is jointly headed by Dr Yaw
Osafo Maafo(Ghana), the Senior Minister, the supervisory Minister of all other government
appointees of the Akufo-Addo administration, and Adama Tanagra(Cote d’Ivoire), the long
standing negotiator and a close confidant of the President of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire,
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oversee the orderly execution of the judgement,”159 This appears to be a
continuation of the trend started by two other African States, Cameroon and
Nigeria, who after the decision of the ICJ in a territorial and maritime dispute
case, agreed to set up a mixed-commission to amicably implement the decision
of the ICJ. The African Union, welcoming this approach to post-decision
implementation in the Cameroon and Nigeria situation, described it as “a major
event in the area of peaceful resolution of conflicts,” and pointed to it as “a source
of inspiration for all African actors involved in conflicts.” It also called on the
international community to recognise it as “a strong point worthy of praise and
a significant contribution of Africa to safeguard world peace.”160 There are
however some important differences between the post-decision implementation
state of affairs in Cameroon/Nigeria, on the one hand, and that of Ghana/Cote
d’Ivoire, on the other. First, prior to the institution of the former case the situation
was rather acrimonious between Cameroon and Nigeria. Even after the decision
of the ICJ, the Nigerian government had initially indicated that they would not
accept the ruling of the Court.161 This could be contrasted with the Ghana/Cote
d’Ivoire situation where the Parties appear to have been more cooperative and
harmonious in their engagement with the disputed issues, both prior to the case
and even after the decision of the Chamber.162 Second, in the former case the
Parties appear to have been propelled to adopt the mixed commission by the
intervention of the United Nations (UN) and some big powers, notably the United
Alasanne Outtara, includes high level officers heading relevant Ministries, as well as a whole host
of technical experts, some of who played a major role in the dispute settlement process. Under the
Strategic Partnership Agreement the institutional framework consists of a Conference of Heads of
States responsible for guiding and promoting the implementation of the common strategic policies
as defined by the Agreement; a Joint Implementation and Monitoring Committee responsible for
the implementation and monitoring of the decisions of the Conference; National Implementation
and Monitoring Committee established by each country responsible for the preparation of the
meetings of the Joint Committee and a Technical Committee established by each country
responsible for the preparation of the meetings of the National Implementation Committee. See Art.
II.
159. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, President, Ghana, address at a ceremony in honour of
Ghana’s Maritime Boundary Dispute Legal Team (Oct. 20, 2017) (transcript available in the
Presidency Republic of Ghana Speeches), http://www.presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-
room/speeches/423-address-by-the-president-nana-addo-dankwa-akufo-addo-at-a-cermony-in-
honour-of-ghanas-maritime-boundary-dispute-legal-team [https://perma.cc/D2N2-8CUV].
160. African Union Assembly Declaration of the Assembly of the African Union on the
Peaceful Settlement of the Border Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria: the Bakassi Case, AU
Assemb. Dec.1(XXII) (Jan. 30-1, 2014), http://archive.au.int/collect/auassemb/import/English/
Assembly%20AU%20Decl%201%20(XXII)%20_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y56A-ZCVA].
161. See ODUNTAN, supra note 9, at 220-27; OSA IGIEHON, supra note 16, at 5-7.
162. See supra Part 2, providing the background of the case and supra note 92.  See also
Ghana/Cote D’Ivoire, supra note 2, ¶¶ 179-80 (The Judgment on merits referred to two joint
statements issued by the Presidents of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in 2009 and 2015 emphasising their
determination of the Parties to seek to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their maritime boundary).
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States of America, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, 163while in the
latter case there is no indication of such third party involvement. Third, in the
Cameroon/Nigeria case the UN was actively involved in the implementation
process with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General chairing the
mixed Commission, and the UN had a direct involvement in providing support
to the Commission through its agencies, such as, the United Nations Office for
West Africa and Sahel (UNOWAS). In the Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire situation, on the
other hand, there is no indication that the UN would be directly involved, though
nothing precludes the Parties from seeking indirect support from the UN in the
course of the implementation. Fourth, the Green Tree Agreement between
Cameroon and Nigeria that formed the legal basis for the mixed commission was
rather limited in its focus, as it addressed only the specific issues directly arising
from the Case.164 The Strategic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and Cote
d’Ivoire, on the other hand, as mentioned above, is quite broad, covering other
strategic areas of cooperation going beyond the Case.165 The latter format dealing
with several and rather unrelated issues at the same time makes it a bit more
intricate than that in the Cameroon/Nigeria situation. What would be rather
interesting to see is if the trend of setting up mixed or joint commissions after the
decision of an international Court or Tribunal on delimitation cases would persist
in Africa, especially when the ICJ eventually makes a decision on the merits in
the Somalia v. Kenya case.166
V. CONCLUSION
The Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire decision on the merits is another interesting
addition, emerging from the African region, to the maritime delimitation
jurisprudence. The decision did not introduce any completely innovative addition
to the law of maritime delimitation because, to a large extent, it merely affirmed
163. See Bayo Ojo, Resolution of International Disputes through Preventive Diplomacy by
United Nations: Case Study of the Cameroon v. Nigeria Case, in OSA IGIEHON, supra note 16, at
44, 48-55. 
164. See Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria
concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula (with
annexes and summary of discussions), June 12, 2006, 2542 UNTS I-45354 (also known as The
Green Tree Agreement).
165. See Tullow’s new rig heads to TEN fields to commence drilling of wells, supra note 149.
166. See supra note 7. One of the authors of this article as a member of an ad hoc expert group
established by the African Union Commission to advise on and put together draft annexes to the
African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) had, in
addition to proposing that an ad hoc Chamber dealing with law of the sea issues, including
delimitation of maritime boundaries, be included in the merged African Court of Justice and
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, suggested that there should be provision to encourage
African States to utilize an ad hoc mixed or joint commission to implement delimitation decisions. 
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the growing trend in international jurisprudence towards applying the
equidistance/relevant circumstances as the generally accepted method of
delimitation of the EEZ and the CS, with alternative methodologies only
applicable when it is impossible or inappropriate to draw a provisional
equidistance line. However, there are certain important lessons that could be
discerned from this case. First, it would appear that the adoption by the Parties to
the case of a mostly cooperative rather than an antagonist approach to dispute
settlement under Part XV of the UNCLOS, especially with the utilisation of the
ITLOS ad hoc Special Chamber with a limited number of judges, including ad
hoc judges chosen by both sides, appears to have contributed to the relatively
speedy disposal of the case. Second, it affirms the difficulties Parties to a
maritime boundary disputes generally face in establishing the existence of a tacit
Agreement or proving the applicability of estoppel in such cases. Third, though
as pointed out above, the decision was not particularly ground-breaking in its
engagement with maritime boundary delimitation methodology, it is certainly a
welcome addition to the burgeoning cases that affirms the equidistance relevant
circumstances methodology as the generally acceptable one for EEZ and CS
delimitation, along with the three-step approach, thus contributing to achieving
predictability in the law of maritime delimitation. Fourth, the post-judgement
implementation of the decision of the Special Chamber points to what appears to
be an interesting emerging practice, amongst some Africa States that are parties
to international cases, of establishing mixed or joint commissions consisting of
members from both Parties to amicably work out the practical details as regard
the implementation of the judgement on the merits.
